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POLITICAL CANDIDATES' LOYALTY OATHS
When Washington mustered his revolutionary army, 1 when South Carolinians called for secession, 2 and when Senator Joseph P. McCarthy
kindled fears of Communist infiltration, 3 many people affirmed their loyalty to the nation by swearing oaths. Perhaps the oath givers hoped to
subdue the anxieties of those anxious times by reducing the ambiguities
4
in the behavior and beliefs of others.
Candidates for political office have not escaped suspicion; eight states
still require political candidates to swear oaths of loyalty before their
names can appear on the ballot. 5 But constitutional doctrine and changing
times have diminished the loyalty oath's scope and significance. 6 This
1 Concerned about cooperation between American soldiers and the British, Washington successfully demanded that Congress require every soldier to take an oath.
H. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SOULS 82 (1959).
2 In the swirl of events surounding the Nullification controversy, the South Carolina
legislature passed a loyalty oath for officers of the state militia. Unionists strongly
objected to the oath because it seemed to place allegiance to the state above allegiance
to the federal government. It was eventually struck down in the South Carolina Court
of Appeals. Id. at 122-33.
3 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREssION 215-25 (1970). See
generally R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958); Comment, The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1160 (1972); Comment, The
Pervasive Effects of McCarthyisn on Recent Loyalty Oath Cases, 16 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 437, 447-52 (1972).
4 Exemplifying the fears which have motivated some subversive control provisions
is the introduction to a Louisiana enactment:
There exists a world communist movement, directed by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the other communist bloc nations, which
has as its declared objective, world control. Such world control is to
be brought about by aggression, force and violence, and is to be accomplished in large by... infiltration, subversion, propaganda, terrorism, and treachery.... Communist control of a country is characterized
by an absolute denial of the right of self-government and by the abolition of those personal liberties which are cherished and held
sacred in the state of Louisiana....
The world communist movement constitutes a clear and present danger
to the citizens of the State of Louisiana.
The public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this
state require the immediate enactment of this measure.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:358 (Supp. 1974).
5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-10.1 (Smith-Hurd
1965); as amended, (Supp. 1973-74); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:372 (Supp. 1974);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 15 (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 588:15 (1955); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 224 (1959), as anended, (Supp. 1973-74); TEX. ELECTION CODE
art. 6.02 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.18.030 (1965). Arizona bars the Communist
Party specifically and subversive organizations in general from the ballot. ARz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16-206 (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
6
See Israel, Ellbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 193;
Sager, The Impact of Supreme Court Loyalty Oath Decisions, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 39
(1972); Note, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 383 (1973); Note, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 898 (1973);

Note, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 209 (1966); 19 N.Y.L.F. 185 (1973); 21 Sw. L.J. 684
(1967); 14 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1968).
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article examines the wane of political candidates' loyalty oaths and uses
the Maryland experience7 as a basis for evaluating what remains.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS OF THE OATHS

The main constitutional problem with candidates' loyalty oaths has been
their vagueness. 8 For example, an officeseeker who is required to forswear "subversive" status-that of a person who would overthrow the
government "by revolution, force, or violence"-might understandably
be confounded by a request to compare his conduct or beliefs with those
vague terms. The Constitution demands more precise standards of behavior so that citizens can intelligently comply with the law10 without inordinate fear of unintentional transgression.11 The candidate might also
2
be forced to deny any association with a "subversive organization;"'1
7 See Asper, The Long and Unhappy History of Loyalty Testing in Maryland, 13
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1969).
8 See generally Sager, supra note 6; Comment, The Loyalty Oath as a Condition
of Public Employmnent, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 479 (1967); Comment, The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, supra note 3; Comment, Loyalty Oaths, 77
YALE L.J. 739 (1968).
9 See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 15 (1957), which defines a "subversive person" as
[Any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person
to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act
intended to overthrow destroy or alter.., the constitutional form of the
government of the United States, or of the State of Maryland,....
by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a member of a subversive
organization....
A "subversive orgainzation" is defined as
[Any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or
teaches.., activities intended to overthrow, destroy or alter ...the
constitutional form of the government ...by revolution, force, or

violence.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 1 (1957). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 588:15
(1955). In Lisker v. Kelley, the court referred to the definition of a subversive person
as one who
commits, attempts to commit, or knowingly aids in the commission of
any act intended to overthrow, destroy, alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form of government.. . by force or violence....
315 F. Supp. 777, 779 (M.D. Pa. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 928 (1971).
10 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
11 Justice White noted the contours of the problem:
We are dealing with indefinite statutes whose terms, even narrowly
construed, abut upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms.... Those with a conscientious regard for what they solemnly
swear or affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite
language, avoid the risk of loss of employment.., only by restricting
their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may
not be so inhibited.
Id. at 372.
12 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-10.1 (Smith-Hurd 1965), as amended, (Supp.
1973-74); LA, REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:372 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05
(1965) (declared unconstitutional in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961) and Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971)). See also Communist
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indeed, his political party might have to make similar assertions. 13 The
same problems of vagueness apply. For example, with regard to the possibility of proscribed involvement with the Communist Party, Mr. Justice
White has written:
Persons required to swear they understand this [loyalty] oath
may quite reasonably conclude that any person who aids the
Communist Party or teaches or advises known members of the
Party is a subversive person because such teaching or advice
or at some future date aid the activities of the
may now
14
Party.
This understanding of an oath, created in unconstitutionally vague lan6
guage, 15 might induce its taker to forgo important constitutional rights.
First among these constitutional rights is the privacy of one's beliefs.
A Texas loyalty oath, which required an affirmation of the aspirant's
belief in and approval of "our present representative form of government"17 was held unconstitutional" because the phrase, "present representative form of government," could be read to exclude permissible beliefs in communism, fascism, or the like. 19 The court said that "[n]o
of
state may condition the right to seek elective office on the willingness
20
candidates to foreswear their political beliefs and thoughts.
A second right is the somewhat more restricted freedom to express
those beliefs. For example, the Indiana requirement that a political party
swear "not [to] advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence . . ." before it could have candidates placed on
22
the ballot 2' was held to violate constitutional freedoms of expression.
The Indiana oath improperly included "advocacy of abstract doctrine"-a
protected right-along with "advocacy of action" to overthrow the gov23
ernment by force or violence-not a right at all.
A third right infringed by loyalty oaths is one's freedom of association.2 4 Florida is one state in which mere association with a group is not
permitted to preclude one's candidacy. That state's oath 25 was held perParty of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 42 U.S.L.W. 4129 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1974) (dealing with
prerequisites to the placement of a political party's candidates on the ballot) and
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (dealing with oaths for state employees).
13 See Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 42 U.S.L.W. 4129 (U.S. Jan. 9,
1974).
14 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1964).
15 See Morris, Baggett v. Bullitt: Scienter & "Guiltless Knowing Behavior," I
LAW IN TRANS.

Q. 185 (1964).

16 See T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 240.
17 TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 6.02 (1952).
18 Socialist Workers Party v. Hill, 483 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973).
19
483 F.2d at 557.
20

Id.

21 IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1-11-12 (1971).
22 Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb,

23 42 U.S.L.W. at 4131.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1965).

42 U.S.L.W. 4129 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1974).
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missible only to screen out officeseekers with a specific intent to further
the unlawful aims of an organization bent upon violent overthrow of the
government; a person's beliefs in overthrow could not alone be used as a
26
basis for disqualification.
In order to protect these constitutional rights 27 and remedy unconstitutional vagueness, 28 candidates' loyalty oaths must avoid much of the
language that has characterized them for so long.
II.

THE

ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY

VALID OATHS

The strictures outlined above 29 have not, however, eliminated the candidates' loyalty oath entirely. For example, the following oath would probably withstand a constitutional challenge:
I... do solemnly swear (or affirm) to uphold the laws and Constitution of ... (name of state) ...and the United States. I
further swear (or affirm) that I am not engaged in any attempt
to overthrow or destroy the constitutional form of government
by force or violence. "
This oath consists of two parts: the first is an affirmative promise to uphold the law, and the second is a denial of improper activity. Both types
of statements seem to be well supported in the decisions reviewing loyalty
oaths.
The affirmative promise to uphold the law resembles the President's
oath of office, which is contained in the Constitution. 31 Therefore, the
constitutionality of the affirmation can hardly be in doubt. Loyalty oaths
32
that include this promise have consistently been upheld in that respect.
The safest promise seems to be one that is "addressed to the future, prom'33
ising constitutional support in broad terms."
The denial of improper activity presents more complex problems. For
example, an officeseeker can be required to swear that he is not a
"subversive" 34 if the statute defines that term to mean a person who:
commits, attempts to commit, or knowingly aids in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, alter, or to
assist in -the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form of government... by force or violence .... 35
26 See Connell v. Higginbotham, 305 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla. 1969), a/f'd in part
403 U.S. 207 (1971).
27 See notes 15-26 and accompanying text supra.
28 See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
29 See part I supra.
30 See Comment, State Loyalty Oaths: A Constitutional Resurrection, 24 FLA. L.
REV. 555, 563 (1972).
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
32 Socialist Workers Party v. Hill, 483 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973).
33 Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 681 (1972). The opposite of an "affirmative"
oath is the "test" oath, which demands a denial of any past subversive activity. See
18 A.L.R.2d 268, 274 (1951).
34 See note 9 supra.
35 Lisker v. Kelley, 315 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Pa. 1970), af/'d, 401 U.S. 928 (1971)

(footnotes omitted).
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As a requisite ingredient of the oath, however, the term "force or violence" has been given special meaning.36 "Force or violence" must refer
to either action to overthrow the government3 7 or advocacy of action
which creates a probable danger of the destruction of the state.3 8 The
other important problem with the denial of improper activity concerns
one's organizational ties. A political candidate can probably be required
to swear that he neither currently belongs to an organization which has
the unlawful purpose of promoting violent overthrow nor specifically intends to help carry out such an organization's unlawful purposes.3 9 This
broad denial may be permissible because the Constitution does not recognize a right to overthrow the government by force, violence, or other
40
illegal means.
Today, then, the eight states with candidates' loyalty oaths 41 can constitutionally employ only a rudimentary oath which affirms support for the
law and denies activity designed to overthrow the government by force
42
or violence.
I1.

THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT

IN MARYLAND

In Maryland, the candidates' loyalty oath has been increasingly circumscribed as the constitutional constraints upon oaths have tightened. The
4:
Maryland oath began as part of the Subversive Activities Act of 1949,
which required political aspirants to affirm that they were not "subversive" people. 44 That requirement was first interpreted as one of forswearing any involvement "in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence," as well as any conscious
membership in an organization engaged in such an endeavor. 4 When
Maryland's Attorney General promised to require an oath no broader than
this, the Supreme Court sustained the formulation. 46
However, the Attorney General later changed the loyalty oath when
the Supreme Court ruled that an individual's activity in subversive organizations could be proscribed only if the person were an active member
of it, knew of its illegal purposes, and acted with specific intent to further
those purposes. 47 A candidate would now have to swear
I, ... do hereby certify that I am not engaged in one way or
another in the attempt to overthrow the Government of the
36 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385
U.S. 589 passim (1967).
37 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
38 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951).
39 Hughes v. Kramer, 82 Wash. 2d 537, 541 (1973).
40 See 43 Miss. L.J. 543 (1972).
41 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
42 See notes 29-40 and accompanying text supra.
43 MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A (1969).
44
1d. § 1.
45 Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 192 (1950).
46 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56, 57 (1951).
47 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966) (involving loyalty oaths for state
employees).
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political subUnited States, or the State of Maryland, or any
48
division of either of them, by force or violence.
Nevertheless, litigation involving the oath persisted, and, although no
political candidate was a party to it, the judicial decisions that followed
further changed the content of the oath. A state employee who refused
to take the oath in its new form successfully argued that Maryland's definitions of "subversive person" 49 and "subversive organization" 50 were
still part of the statutory basis for the oath;," therefore, the definitions
were held unconstitutionally broad because they forced the oath taker to
eschew both peaceful and violent alteration of the government, as well as
unknowing and knowing membership in a subversive organization. 5 2 The
Attorney General responded by relieving state employees of their obliga53
tion to take the loyalty oath.
The oath, however, may not be dead. On the basis of a decision54 that
56
the
parts of the Maryland statute dealing with sedition5 5 remain valid,

Attorney General said that the act would be constitutional if the definitions of "subversive person" 7 and "subversive organization" 5 s were
limited to:
a person [or organization] who commits, or attempts to commit,
any act intended to overthrow or destroy the constitutional form
of the government of the State of Maryland, or any subdivision
thereof, by force or violence. 59
If the Attorney General is correct, then a candidates' loyalty oath based
upon the proposed definitions might withstand constitutional attack. Only
further litigation can clarify exactly what a Maryland officeseeker may be
required to swear.
IV.

THE SIGNIFICANCE

OF WHAT REMAINS

Today, a political aspirant in any of eight states 60 may have to swear,
at most, a rather truncated oath. 61 While the penalties for false swearing
could be severe, 62 their significance will depend upon the actual rate of
48 54 Op. MD. ATT'Y GEN. 151, 152 (1969).
49 MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 1 (1969).
50 Id.

51 Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 56-57 (1967).
52 Id. at 61-62.
53 See 54 OP. MD. ATT'Y GEN. 151, 154 (1969).

54 Washington Free Community v. State's Attorney, 310 F. Supp. 436 (D. Md. 1970).
55 MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A § 2-9 (1969).
56 Washington Free Community v. State's Attorney, 310 F. Supp. 436, 445 (D. Md.

1970).
57 MD. ANN. CODE

art. 85A, § 1 (1969).

58 Id.
59 56 OP. MD. ATT'Y GEN. 418, 420 (1971).
60 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
61 See note 30 supra.
62 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970). The Act provides penalties of up to $20,000
and twenty years imprisonment for anyone who knowingly or willfully advocates,
abets, or advises the overthrow of the federal government by force or violence.
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prosecution. Whether loyalty oaths are genuinely useful is subject to some
doubt. While national security considerations may linger from the McCarthy era, 63 they should be weighed against the effects of forcing people to
proclaim their innermost beliefs 64 and the consequent risk of repressing
dissent and diversity. 65 As Mr. Justice Black has written: 66
Loyalty oaths, as well as other contemporary "security measures," tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or unpopular
thinking or expression-the kind of thought and expression
which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history
of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in
the end may well turn out to be more destructive to our free
society than foreign agents could ever hope to be.... I am
certain that loyalty to the United States can never be secured
by the endless proliferation of "loyalty" oaths; loyalty must
people who love their
arise spontaneously from the hearts of
67
country and respect their government.
These remarks should suggest the merit of repealing the candidates' loyalty oath statutes which remain 68 and refraining from enacting new ones.
If the states follow this policy, then the present candidates' loyalty oaths
can be eliminated, and citizens will have to trust in a free and open electoral system to give them the leaders they want.
-Jeffrey F. Liss

63
64

See T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 205; H. HYMAN, supra note 1, at 413.
See generally In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) and Mr. Justice Brennan's dis-

senting opinion in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959).
65 See T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 202:
It is difficult to see how the social interest in internal security is served

by exclusion of a political party from the political process. On the contrary, the danger to the state or nation would surely be enhanced by
denying to any party or group the possibility of redressing their
grievances through democratic procedures.
66 Speiser v. Randall, U.S. 513, 529 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
67 id. at 532 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black consistently rejected the balancing
approach to loyalty oath litigation, preferring to afford full protection to first amendment rights. See Askin, Loyalty Oaths in Retrospect: Freedom and Reality, 1968
Wis. L. REV. 498, 504 n. 16.
68 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.

